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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3121 
___________ 
 
JAMES LAQUAN GERMANY, 
          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
POWER 105.1 RADIO; FOX 5 NEWS NY; FOX WORLD NEWS; ABC NEWS NY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-13511) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2019 
Before:  MCKEE, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 29, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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James Laquan Germany (Appellant) appeals the District Court’s sua sponte 
dismissal of his complaint.  We will affirm the dismissal, although we do so for reasons 
different from those set forth by the District Court. 
Appellant filed his complaint in the District Court against Power 105.1 Radio, Fox 
5 News New York, Fox World News, and ABC News New York (collectively, 
Defendants) alleging invasion of privacy and use of his likeness without consent, among 
other things.  Along with his complaint, Appellant filed an application to proceed in 
forma pauperis (IFP); however, he paid the filing fee to the clerk.  The District Court, 
before the appearance of any Defendants, issued an order sua sponte dismissing 
Appellant’s complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
The District Court noted that Appellant alleged Defendants “‘monitored’ him ‘24/7’ 
without his consent, invaded his privacy, cast him in a ‘fake light,’ and used his image 
without his consent.”  Dkt. # 4.  The District Court concluded that Appellant’s “potential 
causes of action are unclear” and found the facts provided in his complaint were 
insufficient to support a claim for relief.  Dkt. # 4.  Appellant appealed. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Questions of law—
including the scope of a district court’s authority under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure—are subject to plenary review.”  Lassiter v. City of Philadelphia, 716 F.3d 53, 
55 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013).  We may affirm on alternative grounds, even on a ground that a 
district court may not have considered, as long as it finds support in the record.  See 
Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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After review, for reasons set forth in the margin, we conclude that the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Appellant’s complaint was inappropriately based on Rule 
12(b)(6).1  Nevertheless, we conclude that dismissal was ultimately appropriate.  See 
Hughes, 242 F.3d at 122 n.1.  A federal court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(1) when the 
allegations within the complaint “are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely 
devoid of merit.”  Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Appellant’s claim of 24/7 monitoring by news organizations, 
“by means unknown,” for the past thirteen years—apparently aimed at him for no 
reason—is a fantastic scenario lacking any arguable factual basis, and one which 
Appellant points to no credible evidence to support.  See id.  Moreover, this allegation 
serves as the cornerstone for Appellant’s other claims, including regular public ridicule, 
invasion of privacy, and exposure to the public’s “comments and thoughts.”  While we 
recognize the “substantiality” doctrine has been criticized as “more ancient than 
                                              
1 A court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) after service 
of process.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 n.15 (3d Cir. 2002).  
However, here, it does not appear Appellant was given an opportunity to respond to the 
complaint’s deficiencies; rather, the District Court issued an unqualified order of 
dismissal with no opportunity to amend.  See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
236 (3d Cir. 2008) (suggesting that district courts, absent a futility finding, should 
expressly allow a curative amendment).  Moreover, Appellant paid the filing fee below—
as he has for the appeal here—and the District Court made no ruling on Appellant’s IFP 
status.  Accordingly, the District Court could not dismiss his complaint under the 
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (granting a 
court authority to dismiss a case sua sponte if it is “frivolous or malicious”).  Thus, to the 
extent the dismissal was based on either method, it was done so in error. 
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analytically sound,” it remains the federal rule.  See id. at 538; see also, e.g., Roman v. 
Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will modify the District Court’s judgment to make 
the dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) rather than pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment as modified.2 
                                              
2 We deny Appellant’s motion to expedite, as he has offered no reason to warrant 
expedition.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 4.1 (noting that to prevail on a motion to expedite, the 
movant must put forth an “exceptional reason that warrants expedition” (emphasis 
added)).   
